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1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A4-103(2)0 (Rev. 2008).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff/appellant, Asael Fair & Sons Company ("Fair") did not seek summary
judgment against defendants/appellees, Stephen D. Kirchen ("Kirchen"), Central Bonds
& Insurance Agency, Inc. and Central Bonds & Insurance Company Incorporated
(collectively "Central Bonds"). (Record ("R.") 1384-1393) Accordingly, the only issue
on appeal involving Central Bonds is whether the district court properly granted Central
Bonds' Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). (R. 2979-81). Central Bonds
preserved the arguments supporting its Motion at R. 2982-3006 and R. 3447-3486. Fair's
opposition to the Motion is preserved at R. 3181-89.
A party such as Fair opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, and who has the burden of proof at trial, may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of its pleading. The non-moving party, by affidavits or other
competent evidence, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, fs 16, 18, 177 P.3d 600.
In an earlier decision the Utah Supreme Court provided a more expansive
discussion of the burdens at the summary judgment phase on a non-moving party that
will have the burden at trial:
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[0]nce the moving party has brought forth evidence either tending to prove
a lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging the existence of one
of the elements of the cause of action, the nonmoving party then bears the
burden of providing some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of
the essential elements of [its] claim. Id.
Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted).
Similarly,
To successfully defend against a motion for summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must set forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party's case. Failure to do so with regard to any
of the essential elements of that party's claim will result in a conclusion that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In such a
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^ 23, 116 P.3d 323 (emphasis added).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Farr manufactures, stores, distributes and markets (i) ice cream, (ii) soft serve ice
cream mixes and (iii) frozen desserts. (R. 296, T| 20.a)) Farr avers that "an electric
condenser fan motor accidentally sheared off its mount and severed an ammonia line
thereby releasing ammonia that contaminated all of [Farr's] Products stored therein
thereby rendering the same unmarketable and of no value." (R. 301, ^ 26) The insurance
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policies in effect a( Hit" link ul Hit
claimed damages
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(R 302, % 30) Fan* sought a declaration of the respective liability of

the defendants and an award of damages. (R. 309, ^fs 53-54)
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However, once co-defendant/anr-'llee Trustco, iiu,.

("Tru^tc^"» \'\\M its Notice of Intention to Seek Apportionment of Fault to Steve Kirchen
and
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captioned "Second Amended Complaint.)
In stating its claim,, against Central Bonds, i arr averred dial ^u-victendaiiLappellee,
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that Central Bonds became jointly and severallv liable , a L the *^er defendants for
Reed's averred actions and promises regarding the procurement of insurance foi I'arr's
reiilll piopcity (Is1 KM), "f M), .mid llial (Vnlral Bonds I inic'lior! ulllhni Il miil in "s o w n ] I > II', HIT
(R. 302-03, ^[ 30). A s remedies, f a i r sought damages, bad-faith damages, costs and
attorney fees. (R 309-10)
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DISTRICT COIJRT
After completion of fact discoverv Central Bonds filed its Motion and supporting
mem.orand
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led an opposing memorandum,. (I'

1' 1 li I•••

89). After oral argument, the district court granted Central Bonds' Motion (R. 3504-05).
The district court explained its dismissal of Fair's claims against Central Bonds:
Farr had no contractual relationship with Kirchen or Central Bonds.
Consequently, all of Fair's causes of action against defendant stem from an
alleged agency relationship between Reed and Kirchen and Reed and
Central Bonds, under which Reed, as defendants' agent, acted on their
behalf and subject to Kirchen and Central Bonds' control. Contrary to
plaintiffs theory, the record contains no evidence of an agency relationship
between Reed and Kirchen or Reed and Central Bonds. To be an agent a
person "must be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to
his control'" Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah. 970 P.2d 1265, 1269
(Utah l99S)(citing, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). Here, to
the contrary, Reed expressly denies that he was an agent of either Kirchen
or Central Bonds. Second Andrew Reed Deposition, at 399-400. Absent
evidence of an agency relationship, Fair's claims against Kirchen and
Central Bonds for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and estoppel all
fail. (R. 3505) (emphasis added)
III.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED

The following facts were undisputed before the district court. Even though Farr
purported to "contest" six of these facts discussed in the following footnotes, Fair failed
to identify any evidence contrary to the competent evidence supporting each of those six
facts:
1.

Kirchen is an insurance agent licensed by the State of Utah to sell property,

casualty and life insurance. (R. 2983)
2.

Kirchen is employed as an agent by co-defendant insurance agency, Central

Bonds and Insurance Agency, Inc. (R. 2983)
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\ t all times relevant to the Motion, Dexter Duane Farr ("Mr. Fair"), the

authorized represniUlm

Cm purposes of obtaining insurance coverage for Farr.

(R.

2983)
5.

In that capaciU

i u»i customarily conducted an annual review of I '"an: " s

existing insumikv |i ,' Iliinii "

in

nil.ml i Iian^rs Can needed to make foi the

upcoming year. (R. 2983-84*
6.

Mr, Fair had obtained competitive bids for I "an 's insurance need

approximately 30 3 ^eai s (R 2984)
ANDREW REED'S EFFORTS TO SUBMIT A BID FOR FARR'S PROPERTY,
EQUIPMENT AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
7.
v . .<
Ain'r^^

In i^eDruarv nr

*ri '• * 1 •

Universal Insurance Comp:

Lawn-uu- <*v^ r K e e t P

commeKid:

P

* , .n.

jquipmei,

w H r n m r to subnnnfl ,1 hid

• ked for permission '

. . ; liability insurance;

^A Kansas ^%'Iiinity"),
Mihn/'

' "* r a Fair's
In , .MIS

(R. 2984)

In its opposing memorandum below, Farr merel) am loin iced that it "contested" this fact
(R. 3182). However, Farr failed to identify any contrary evidence, thus failing to satisfy
the requirements of Orvis, Jensen and Anderson Development.
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8.

Mr. Fair was already acquainted with Reed because for the 2002-2003

policy year Reed was providing Fair with workers' compensation insurance through
Farmers Insurance Group ("Farmers"). (R. 2984)
9.

At all times material to the Motion, Reed was a "captive" insurance agent

for Farmers, which means that Reed could represent only Farmers and that he had
complete allegiance to Farmers. (R. 2984-85)
10.

At no time material to this Motion was Reed the agent of either Kirchen or

Central Bonds.2 (R. 2985)
11.

On or about March 20, 2003 Reed began gathering information necessary

for Reed and Farmers to submit a bid for Fair's property, equipment and liability
insurance. (R. 2985)
12.

To assist Reed in putting together his bid, Mr. Fair provided Reed with the

declarations of the various coverages of the Trinity policy, but not premium information.
(R. 2985)

Fair also announced below that it "contested" this statement (R. 3183). The district
court found in its Ruling (R. 3505), however, that the undisputed evidence established
that Reed did not act as Central Bonds' agent while dealing with Fair. Fair never
identified below, and does not identify on appeal, any evidence establishing that Reed
was Central Bonds' agent, or that he had actual authority to represent Central Bonds.
Central Bonds shows in Point II.B, below, that because Fair never communicated with
Central Bonds it was legally impossible for Reed to have had apparent authority to
represent Central Bonds in Reed's dealings with Farr.
829078
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13.

In his discussions with Reed at this time, Mr. Fair requested that one item

of coverage be increased from $600,000 to $700,000, along with maybe a few other items
as well. (R. 2985)
14.

Mr. Fair admitted that Reed was not in a position to suggest such coverage

changes because "he wouldn't know" what changes were necessary or appropriate. (R.
2985)
15.

At some point Reed suggested that Farr raise its existing $25,000 "spoilage

temperature change" insurance to either $50,000 or $75,000, but Mr. Fair declined to
raise the coverage limit. (R. 2985)
16.

Reed suggested other changes as well to Fair's coverage. (R. 2986)

17.

At this time Mr. Fair understood that he could select higher coverages if

Farr paid an additional premium, and that the decision was totally up to him. (R. 2986)
18.

Mr. Fair did not discuss with Reed what the difference in premium would

be with such increased coverage. (R. 2986)
FARR'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN REPLACEMENT PROPERTY, EQUIPMENT AND
LIABILITY INSURANCE AFTER ITS CARRIER NOTIFIED FARR THAT IT
WOULD NOT RENEW FARR'S COVERAGE
19.

In a notice dated March 31, 2003, Trinity advised Fair that Trinity would

not renew Fair's property and liability insurance coverage, which would expire on May
14,2003. (R.2986)
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20.

After receiving Trinity's notice of non-renewal, Mr. Fair spoke with four

additional insurance agents about procuring replacement property and liability insurance.
(R. 2986)
21.

As with Reed, Mr. Farr provided these other potential bidders with only the

declarations of the various coverages of the Trinity policy.

He did not give them

premium information. (R. 2986)
22.

Mr. Farr gave all potential bidders only the declarations from the existing

Trinity policy so he could get an "apples to applies" comparison from each bidder. (R.
2986)
23.

Mr. Farr did this because he wanted to look at the same coverages as

closely as possible so that he could do a cost comparison. (R. 2987)
24.

Mr. Fair told prospective bidders that the prior year's declaration of

coverages was "the outline I wanted them to go down through. And if they needed to
make some adjustments on it, we need to make some adjustments." (R. 2987)
25.

In addition to telling Reed that $25,000 was ample for chemical spills, Mr.

Farr told the same thing to the other potential bidders in 2003. (R. 2987)
REED ASKS FOR CENTRAL BONDS' ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING PROPERTY
AND GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR FARR
26.

Sometime in March 2003 Reed called Kirchen to see if Central Bonds

might have a market for the Farr account in the event Farmers was not interested in
writing it. (R. 2987)

829078
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27.

This was a very casual conversation, and it ended with Reed telling Kirchen

that Reed would call Kirchen if Reed needed Central Bonds' and Kirchen's help. (R.
2987)
28.

Reed contacted his friend Kirchen because Reed did not want an unfriendly

agent to divert Farr's workers' compensation and automobile coverages from Reed. (R.
2988)
29.

Within a week of his meeting with Mr. Fair, Reed knew that Farmers

would not issue a bid for Farr's property and general liability coverage because of the
proximity of two of Farr's Salt Lake City buildings to each other. (R. 2988)
30.

Reed and Farmers did, however, have the workers compensation and

automobile liability coverages "wrapped up" and wanted to keep that portion of Farr's
business. (R. 2988)
31.

In Reed's capacity as a "captive" agent, he was free to try to place coverage

with other carriers if Farmers declined coverage. (R. 2988)
32.

In early to mid-April Reed told Kirchen that Farmers had declined to write

property and general liability coverage for Fair, and that Reed "was looking for a home
for it". (R.2988)
33.

Thereafter, Reed gave Farr's bid specifications (the declarations from the

Trinity policy) to Kirchen. (R.2988)
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34.

Kirchen said that he would "'go to market" to see if he could place property

and general liability insurance coverage for Fair. (R. 2988)
35.

Although Reed referred bond work to Central Bonds, he did not receive a

kickback or a commission for those referrals. (R. 2988)
36.

Kirchen and Reed agreed that any bid that Kirchen solicited would not "dip

as low" as Fair's bid specifications called for. (R. 2989)
37.

Kirchen then contacted CNA, Allied and Auto Owners Insurance ("Auto

Owners") insurance companies. (R. 2989)
38.

CNA declined to make a quotation because of a "time issue", i.e., it needed

more time than was available to properly estimate and price the risks involved. (R. 2989)
39.

Allied declined to make a quotation because of concerns about ammonia

losses, spoilage and property values, among other things. (R. 2989)
40.

Kirchen also approached Auto Owners about quoting property and general

liability coverage for Fair. (R. 2989)
41.

Central Bonds and Kirchen had access to an in-house Auto Owners rating

program that allowed them to use "information from the insured to go in and classify
business, rate it up, price it out, and then work with the underwriters on final pricing,
coverages, etc." (R. 2989)

829078
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42.

Neither Kirchen nor Central Bonds had the authority to bind the property

and general liability coverage that Farr required.
43.

(R. 2989)

Auto Owners' regional underwriter was "comfortable" with the pricing

Kirchen generated from the in-house rating system, but emphasized that Auto Owners'
home office would have to make the final underwriting decision because of the size of
the prospective Farr account and the high property values involved with Farr's Salt Lake
City facilities.4 (R. 2989-90)
44.

Probably on May 13, 2003, Kirchen provided to the Auto Owners

underwriting department all the information he had assembled to that point regarding
Farr. (R. 2990)

3

Farr similarly contested this fact below (R. 3183-84). Again, however, Farr identified
no evidence establishing that Central Bonds in fact had authority to bind coverage. Farr
cited only to Reed's testimony, but Reed testified that he had no idea whether Central
Bonds could bind Auto Owners coverage (R. 3480-81). As a result, Farr again has failed
to satisfy the requirements of Orvis, Jensen and Anderson Development.
4

This is the fourth fact that Farr contested below (R. 3183-84), but again Farr did not
identify any evidence to dispute it. Farr cited only to Reed's testimony, but Reed testified
that he had no idea whether Central Bonds could bind Auto Owners coverage (R. 348081). Kirchen unequivocally testified that he could not bind, and that Auto Owners would
not write (or bind) Farr's Salt Lake location where the Loss occurred, and that Auto
Owners could not write the spoilage and equipment breakdown ("Spoilage") coverage
necessary to cover Farr's Loss (R. 3477). Reed admitted that he had no factual basis for
disputing Kirchen's sworn testimony (R. 3483-84). Once again, there is no evidence that
Central Bonds was able to or did bind coverage, or that Auto Owners could have bound
or issued coverage, for Farr's Salt Lake location or for the Loss that Farr incurred. Once
again, Farr has failed to satisfy the requirements of Orvis, Jensen and Anderson
Development.
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45.

Kirchen knew, however, that because of its reinsurance agreements with

other insurance companies who insured such risks, Auto Owners could not quote spoilage
or equipment breakdown ("Spoilage") coverage for Fair's Salt Lake City facilities. (R.
2990)
46.

As a result, Auto Owners could not write Spoilage coverage that would

have covered the loss that Fair incurred (the "Loss"). (R. 3448, 3477)
47.

In order to get Spoilage coverage for Fair's Salt Lake City facilities,

Kirchen requested a separate quotation for that coverage from Travelers Boiler Express
("Travelers"). (R. 2990)
48.

Kirchen requested Travelers to quote a higher Spoilage limit than was

shown in Fair's bid specifications, and the Travelers quote shows Spoilage coverage limit
of $100,000. (R.2990)
THE MAY 2003 BIDDERS FOR FARR'S PROPERTY AND LIABILITY
INSURANCE
49.

Lund-Leavitt Insurance Agency submitted a bid dated May 12, 2003 for

Fair's property, equipment and liability insurance. (R. 2990)
50.

Diversified Insurance Brokers submitted a bid dated May 13, 2003 for

Fair's property, equipment and liability insurance. (R. 2991)
51.

On the afternoon of May 14, 2003, Blackburn Jones Company ("Blackburn

Jones"), which had represented Farr since some time in the '70s or early '80s with
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occasional gaps, and had placed Farr's coverage with Trinity beginning in 2000, gave Mr.
Farr an oral bid for coverage to be written by Safeco. (R. 2991)
52.

The Blackburn Jones/Safeco bid was about $8,000 higher than the

Reed/Farmers bid. (R. 2991)
53.

The proposal that Reed gave Mr. Farr described various coverages, but the

only copy of that proposal admitted into evidence does not show a premium.5 (R. 2991)
54.

There is no evidence in the Record of the premium that Reed quoted to Mr.

Farr or of the components of that premium. (R. 2991)
55.

Because the proposed coverages in the Lund-Leavitt, Diversified Insurance

Brokers, Blackburn Jones/Safeco and Reed/Farmers proposals afforded about the same
coverage, Mr. Farr "chose Farmers Insurance Company" because it had the best price of
the three, and sometime the morning of May 14, 2003, Mr. Fair told Reed that Fair would
accept the Farmers bid. (R. 2991-92)
56.

Mr. Farr probably looked at the prices more than anything else. (R. 2992)

57.

In fact, for this particular year and in the 8-10 preceding years, Mr. Fan-

accepted the lowest bid for Farr's insurance. (R. 2992)
58.

After Mr. Farr awarded him Farr's insurance business, Reed asked Mr. Farr

who submitted the next closest quote for Farr's insurance; Mr. Farr told Reed that it was
Safeco. (R.2992)
5

Central Bonds discusses the significance of the various 2003 insurance quotations in
Point VII, infra.
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59.

As of May 14, 2003, Mr. Farr still understood from Reed that Farmers

would provide all of Fair's insurance, including property and liability coverage. (R.
2992)
EVENTS FOLLOWING MAY 14, 2003
60.

On May 22nd or 23rd, Auto Owners' regional office advised Kirchen that

Auto Owners' home office had declined property and general liability coverage. (R.
2992)
61.

Insurance from both Auto Owners and Travelers were necessary parts of a

whole package. When Auto Owners declined to issue a quotation for Fair's property and
general liability coverage, the Travelers bid "went away".6 (R. 2992)
62.

Kirchen immediately informed Reed that Auto Owners would not issue a

quotation for Fair's property and general liability insurance. (R. 2992)
63.

After Reed learned that Auto Owners would not issue a quotation for Farr,

he told Kirchen that Safeco had an outstanding bid through another agent, and that Reed
thought that he might be able to place Fair's property and general liability coverage
through an insurance agency that represented Safeco. (R. 2993)

6

Finally, Farr contested below (R. 3184-85) Undisputed Facts 61 and 62 (numbered
below as Undisputed Facts 63 and 64 (R. 2992-93)). In doing so, Farr merely reiterated
arguments it made elsewhere. Farr identified no evidence supporting its challenge, and
did not dispute below Undisputed Facts 47 and 48 in Central Bonds' initial memorandum
(R. 2990) (Undisputed Facts 45 and 47 above), both of which provide the unchallenged
foundation for the two challenged paragraphs. Once again, Farr has failed to satisfy the
requirements of Orvis, Jensen and Anderson Development.
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64.

Kirchen told Reed that he knew someone at another independent insurance

agency, co-defendant, Trustco, Inc. ("Trustco"), which was a Safeco agent, and Reed
asked Kirchen to call Trustco to see if it would be interested in working with Reed to
quote the outstanding Safeco bid. (R. 2993)
65.

Kirchen then telephoned Troy Granger ("Granger") of Trustco to explain

the situation to him. (R. 2993)
66.

Granger said he was interested, and Kirchen agreed to ask Reed to call

Granger. (R. 2993)
67.

Kirchen then told Reed that he could call Granger. (R. 2993)

68.

Kirchen and Central Bonds had no further involvement with the Fan-

account. (R.2993)
69.

On May 23, 2003 Reed told Mr. Fair that Fair had no property and liability

insurance in place. (R. 2993)
70.

Until then, Mr. Fair had understood that Fair had been insured with no

lapse in coverage. (R. 2993)
71.

Accordingly on May 23, 2003, Mr. Fair signed a letter to Safeco Insurance

that Reed had prepared asking Safeco to bind coverage effective May 23, 2003. (R.
2994)
72.

Mr. Fair understood that Reed needed the letter so that Reed "could

represent the insurance which Farmers wasn't going to cover." (R. 2994)
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73.

Also on May 23, 2003, Mr. Fair gave Reed a $10,640.00 check made

payable to "Safeco". (R. 2994)
74.

Safeco issued a policy covering Farr's property and general liability that

had an effective date of May 23,2003. (R. 2994)
75.

Fair claims that late in the night of May 29, 2003, a motor mount broke

loose from its housing in Farr's Salt Lake City frozen ice cream storage facility, causing a
blower fan to come into contact with, and to sever, an ammonia line coil which led to
ammonia contamination of Farr's ice cream inventory and requiring its destruction. (R.
2994)
76.

Safeco admitted liability up to the policy limit for the Loss and issued a

check to Fair for the policy limit. (R. 2994)
ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS PERTAINING TO FARR
77.

Fair never received a copy of any Auto Owners insurance binder. (R.

78.

Before the Loss, the highest limit Fair ever had for ammonia contamination

2994)

was $50,000. (R.2994)
79.

At his deposition Mr. Fair did not know who Kirchen is. (R. 2995)

80.

At his deposition Mr. Fair could not recall ever talking to Kirchen. (R.

2995)
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ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS PERTAINING TO REED
81.

Reed does not know what authority Kirchen and Central Bonds had to bind

Auto Owners. (R. 3448, 3480-81)
82.

Reed does not know what exclusions and endorsements apply to Auto

Owners policies, and cannot recall what, if anything, Kirchen told Reed about Auto
Owners exclusions and endorsements. (R. 3449, 3482)
83.

Reed has no factual basis to dispute Kirchen's statement that Auto Owners

could not have written the coverage that would have applied to Farr's Loss. (R. 3449,
3483)
84.

Reed never received a writing from Central Bonds saying that coverage was

bound. (R. 3450, 3484)
85.

Kirchen never told Reed that coverage was bound. (R. 3450, 3484)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As a favor to a friend of Kirchen's, Kirchen and Central Bonds spent three weeks
in May 2003 trying to find insurance coverage for a company (Fair) that Kirchen never
spoke with.
Notwithstanding its utter lack of contact with Central Bonds, Farr now claims that
that Central Bonds (i) assumed a duty to procure coverage for Fair's risks, (ii) orally
committed Auto Owners to provide that coverage; (iii) breached its contract with Farr by
failing to obtain that coverage; and (iv) committed bad faith in denying that Auto Owners
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had bound coverage for Fair's Loss. Farr also brought (but did not discuss in its initial
brief) an estoppel claim against Central Bonds.
As the party with the burden of proof at trial, Farr is obliged to set forth facts
sufficient to establish the existence of each element essential to its various claims. Fanrepeatedly tries to establish its assertions with argument, not with facts, and the record
contains no evidentiary support for critical elements of Fair's claims. Fair's failure to
establish even one element essential to each of its claims necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial, and that claim fails.
For example, Fair claims that some, if not all, of its claims against Central Bonds
are derivative of Reed's acts. Both Reed and Central Bonds deny that there was any
agency, and the Record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.
Furthermore, controlling precedent makes clear that (i) Central Bonds was under
no duty to Farr; (ii) Central Bonds' efforts did not result in a binder or other contract of
insurance; and (iii) Farr's claims against Central Bonds are too speculative. Because
there was no contract between Central Bonds and Fair, there is no basis for Fair's bad
faith claim against Central Bonds. Fair's estoppel claim fails because Farr had no contact
with Kirchen and Central Bonds, and could not have relied on any admission, statement
or act of Central Bonds.
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ARGUMENT
Fair's opening brief characterizes its claims against Central Bonds in two different
ways. At page 18 Fan* recites that in its Complaint Farr asserted claims against all
appellees foi (I) bi e.ti/li

I i onlui I l iiii) negligence; (iii) bad faith; an ;:1 (i i ) promissory

estoppel. In Fair's discussion oi its claims against Central Bonds at pages 36-40
characterizes its claims against Central Bonds differently: '•* Central Bonds assumed a
c

insurance

:, . :u ;„a

. „;

, ..in; insurance coverage

from Auto Owners; (iii) despite the fact that Central Bounds orally bound coverage, it
failed to provide coverage to Fan* in accordance with the oral contract of insurance; and
(Iv) Central Bonds breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by claiming that
it did not proci ire ii ISI irance tl lat co

' "

'*

Jr

concluded that Fair's Complaint did not MIM the issue of m oral binder, (f

J^LLI;

However, even though Farr s Complaint did not raise the "oral binder" clain 1, as a
precaution, iiowr VT, (Vntral Bonds will ftddtvss tli.il rLiini i

-7.

In this brief, Central Bonds will respond to Fair's reformulated arguments
contained at pages 36 40 of I; an*' s initial brief , Central Bonds will address Fair's claims
in this ordei 1 lull I111I

mil iiiiegligetiu

Iiiiiii!

iiiili'.nl 1I1111 , I I M I I I I J h i i ! ' " 1 ! 1 l.iiiin lh;il i V i i l r . i l

Bonds "bound" coverage); and (iii) bad faith. After that discussion, Central Bonds will
discuss I-arr's estoppel claim, which it fails to address in the portion of its initial brief
direr
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claims against Central Bonds are all so speculative as to preclude its recovery from
Central Bonds irrespective of the Court's analysis of the other issues.
However, Central Bonds first discusses two preliminary matters. First, Central
Bonds shows in Point I, infra, that there is a separate basis for affirmance of the dismissal
of Central Bonds and Insurance Company from this action. Second, Fair seeks to hold
Central Bonds liable for Reed's acts despite Reed's sworn testimony that he was not
Central Bonds' agent. Central Bonds shows in Point II, infra, that Reed had neither
actual nor apparent authority to act on behalf of Central Bonds in his dealings with Fair.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED FARR'S
CLAIMS AGAINST CENTRAL BONDS AND INSURANCE
COMPANY INCORPORATED

The two corporate Central Bonds entities have similar names: (i) Central Bonds &
Insurance Agency, Inc. and (ii) Central Bonds and Insurance Company Incorporated.
Kirchen testified under oath that the latter, Central Bonds and Insurance Company, Inc.,
had no involvement in the events surrounding this action (R. 2983). Fair contested this
before the district court, but identified no contrary evidence. The district court found:
As an initial matter, in opposition to defendants' motion, Fair fails to
effectively dispute and support with contrary evidence defendant Central
Bonds and Insurance Company, Incorporated's claim that it had no
involvement in the events at issue in this litigation. Accordingly, defendant
Central Bonds and Insurance Company, Inc.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted. (R. 3504)
Fair does not challenge or even discuss this ruling by the District Court. There is
no evidence in the Record that Central Bonds and Insurance Company was involved in
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tlii' nents MIIIUIINIIIIM1 I<MI '. I'I.IIIIII'H

I i iln< .IIMIIIOIMI M .IS<UJ„ along wnli ,ill other

reasons addressed in this brief, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of
all i'^ Fair's claims against co-defendant Central Bonds and Insurance Company
I-

I
II.

REED WAS NOT CENTRAL BONDS' AGENT

To some extent, Fair seeks to hold Central Bonds liable for its own acts or for
R a : d \ .1 i1,

I

I

\ linnevet, Kin must provide evidence that Central Bonds gave

Reed either actual or apparent authority. See, < ^
Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah 1988). The district court expressly observed that the
Recoi d c Dntains no e \ Idence of an agency relationship between Reed and Kirchee or
Reed and Central Bonds. (R. 3505)
Fair has failed to identify any evidence showing that Reed had actual authority to
represent Central Bonds. Because ; in- never spoke with Central Bonds, it was legally
impossible for Reed to have had apparent authc 1 it) I: 11 epresent Cent 1 al Boi ids
1

Reed Did Not Have Actual Authority to Represent Central Bonds

Reed expressly denied that he was Kirchen's or Central Bonds' agent. There is no
contrary evidence in the Record that Reei
Kirchen or Central Bonds in his dealings with Fair.
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B.

Reed Did Not Have Apparent Authority to Represent Central Bonds

For there to be apparent authority, the principal must cause third parties to believe
that the agent represents the principal.

See id. at 1095.

Because Fair had no

communication with Central Bonds (who would have to create Reed's apparent
authority), it was impossible as a matter of law for Reed to have apparent authority to act
on behalf of Central Bonds or Kirchen. Because Reed was not Central Bonds' agent,
Central Bonds cannot be liable for Reed's actions.
Furthermore, the record contains no evidence that Central Bonds is liable to Fanas a result of anything that Central Bonds itself did or failed to do.
III.

CENTRAL BONDS DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO FARR TO
PROCURE INSURANCE

Duty is an essential element of negligence. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). It is axiomatic that a plaintiff cannot recover in tort unless a
defendant owes plaintiff a duty. See Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47 ^ 11,
143 P.3d283. Accordingly, the analysis of every tort claim necessarily begins with an
inquiry into the existence and scope of the duty that a defendant owes the plaintiff. See
id.
The issue of whether Central Bonds owed any duty to Fan* "is a purely legal
question, and . . . is the first question to be answered." Id., ^ 14. Duty is not assumed,
presumed or reserved for trial. When a plaintiff cannot prove that a duty exists, it is
proper to dismiss its claims early in the case. See, e.g, Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT
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)i>umrv

Suit I uke t ity Ac hoot Dist

64 H 7, 52 P.3d 1230 (summary judgment); 5eae/i v. University

/IN)/ I 11

of ( -'I'.I/L, V<, P "M A I \

416 (Utah 1986) (summary judgment).
1

.

.. .

oncluding that Central Bonds was under no duty

to procure insurance for Fan*.
In Lewis v. Pike, 663 P.2d 91 (I Jtah 1983) the Lewises gave a trust deed to
defendants to : :)llateralize a loan.

... • , v-. i> ..^

.as

itai -h

encumber the marital residence wile

did not ^\i~* *~
t

time of the loan the Lewises could not agree whether * i» • Lewis' life should be insured
* Lewises told the lender" that tl it] ' would decide about the
insurance for Mrs, I ev is and let the lendei 1 ::i IC > A ' tl leii decision.
Later

ewis tried to order insurance from Pike.

They exchanged calls and

visits, i>u; me t""* never were able to contact each other

!\ ir, I ,ewis died over two

months after taking nui iilii I .in \\\\\

IIIIIII

inn,

IIIMIMIU'I

mui h.t\ mg U r n pkia/il

HI

Ins

life. Id.
Even though no insurance had been placed, Mrs. Lewis contended that the lender
was negligent

IIIIIII IIIIIII

nil iiv-iinni1 llic

IIISIIIKIIIH I

iillul ill km n illln; I vv iscs w.tiilnl

In m i l i u m

this argument, and affirming the district court's dismissal of Mrs. Lewis' complaint, the
Court wrote:
Plaintiff further contends that Pike's failure to follow up on Mr. Lewis'
requests and inquiries constitutes negligence on his part and is actionable
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by her because she was jointly and severally liable with him on the loan.
This argument presupposes that there was some legal duty on Pike to
contact Mr. Lewis and assist him in making a decision as to the Lewis's
insurance requirements. Plaintiff has not cited us to any authority that in
such an instance there is any legal duty on the part of an insurance agent to
promptly follow up on inquiries.
Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
More recently, in Harris v. Albrecht, 2004 UT 13, 86 P.3d 728, the Utah Supreme
Court relied on Lewis and on decisions from other jurisdictions to explain its affirmance
of the district court's dismissal of property owner Harris' claims against insurance agent
Albrecht:
The instant case is similar to Lewis v. Pike, where the court granted
summary judgment against a plaintiff who failed to place a "specific order
for insurance." Likewise, in Stockberger v. Meridian Mutual Insurance
Co., the court stated that no liability arose unless the plaintiff gave
sufficient directions to enable the agent to create a final contract. Harris
failed to give Albrecht sufficient instructions to impose a duly to procure
insurance, and the missing terms could not be implied from the parties'
prior dealings. See Lewis; Boston Camping Distrib. Co. v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co. (holding a request for coverage from "A to Z, second to
none" expressed only an intent to obtain insurance); Wallis v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. (noting that an agent "instructed" by the insured to procure
insurance did not assume a duty). Here, Harris merely requested insurance
and expressed a desire to procure insurance.
The nature of the losses here underscores the reason summary judgment
was appropriate. The most basic business policy includes $5,000 of
protection for valuable papers. Albrecht only had binding authority up to
$25,000 for valuable papers, and Harris could not have received such
coverage without taking loss-reduction measures.
Harris, 2004 UT 13, ^ 29 & n.2 (emphasis added) (reporter citations omitted).
In the process of concluding that insurance agent Albrecht had no duty to architect
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Harris, Iiii I i ml mi h iilitictl I

IIIIII

larlois lliat are rek-* n; in determining il an insurance

agent has assumed a duty to procure insurance:
(1) whether [the agent] gave the proposed insured an application, (2)
whether [the agent] made a bare acknowledgment of a contract covering a
specific kind of casualty even though all the terms had not been settled, (3)
whether [the agent] made promises to procure insurance that lulled [the
proposed insured] into believing a policy had been procured, and (4)
whether there were prior dealings where [the agent] took care of [the
proposed insured]'s needs without consultation
Id "Is 22 and 2 )

- V* in Harris, id <il 11 "' K only the last three factors are relevant to this

case. Analysis of'tlirsc thrcv fai Im in.tkcN
duty to procure insurance for Farr.
First, a "bare acknowledgment" occurs when an agent confirms coverage pending
Ilir

isiiiiiiiH' nl

i I M I IIIIIII ill 1

"l VillI.IIII I "Iniimi*IK

i HI I u i i i t ' d

nothing to Farr because they never communicated with Farr. Indeed, until May 23, 2003,
Farr believed that Farmers had insured Fair's property and general liability risks.
Second, Ion rssrmull
Fair nothing and did not *

I

> • " ii/asmis, i\ in Iiiini ami iVinul boutls promised

_

; j refraining from doing anything to protect itself.

• ..U03 Mr. Fail "chose Farmers", accepted the "Farmers" bid, and understood
i I mi I ill

IIIIII i d i

i l l I ml

II IIIIIII

i n •iii.mi i

I i i t 1 I IIII I II iii]»

( i i 11 [ in" I l \

mi i I I

In in h i 111 \

coverage On May 23, 2003, Mr. Fair learned that Safeco would cover the insurance that
"Farmers wasn't going to cover." At no time during the Spring of 2003 did Mr. Farr
hiiiiiin 11 I 111 IkiiH'ilm mi in ( ni ii ai llMiiiiHls i yslnil HI MI ill llllic) Iliad unsuccessfully tried to place
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Farr's insurance with four different carriers.
Third, it is undisputed that there were no prior dealings between Fair on the one
hand and Kirchen and Central Bonds on the other.
The Harris Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment because
"Albrechtfs comments failed to rise to the level of a promise to procure insurance and
were insufficient to lull Harris into believing a policy had been procured because they
lacked the requisite specificity. An agent must affirmatively assure the insured that a
policy will be procured or has been procured." Id. *|[ 24. Kirchen and Central Bonds did
not make any such assurances.
Harris identifies yet another reason why Kirchen and Central Bonds were under
no duty in this case: the "customization required for a business policy" such as the one
Fair needed. See id., \ 26. Here Mr. Fair acknowledged that (i) he had requested one
change to Farr's prior coverage; (ii) an agent "wouldn't know" what changes were
necessary or appropriate without information from Mr. Fair; (iii) even though Reed
suggested raising the Spoilage loss limit, Mr. Fair declined to do so; (iv) Reed had
suggested other changes to Farr's insurance coverage; (v) he understood that Fair could
obtain higher coverage if it paid for it; (vi) he would address suggested "adjustments" to
coverage when they arose; (vii) he selected the insurance carrier in May 2003 based on
price and awarded Farr's business to the lowest bidder and had accepted the lowest bid
for the prior 8-10 years; (viii) Fair had never had more than $50,000 in coverage for
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a I 1111111 i i I «ni i unlit i ni i ni 1111II1111 ni i i i I III I I ' I ' I ni .HI lii" received 11i > m insurance carriers were merely
"bids".
As in Harris,

the kaleidoscopic nature of commercial insurance made it

"impossible1" lor kndien and Central Bonds to have provided Fair with a "standard
business policy". See id. 'There simply was no v a; >/. loi
have known what Fair would ultimately elecl to bu>. Furthermore, the coverage Fan*
needed was beyond Kirchen's and Central Bonds authority to bind. The same was true
for Albrecht. See id.
In Harris, Albrecht lulled Harris "into believing that [Albrecht] would come out
and look, at [I Ian is' j business." Id t ?,7. Even this amount of lulling was insufficient,
howevn

'

-i'Mtc itih

"« hi ' " 'Ibiu'il le p'l'uiu 1 i. anam.

B a a u » il u n c i spoke

with Mr. Fair, Central Bonds could not have lulled Mr. Fair even to that limited extent.
Therefore, just as Albrecht was under no duly lo obtain insurance for Harris,
CVntial Bonds1

H I UIIIHIHI

mm illiiil1,, lo n tin lain iiL-aiiain c <, o\ ci.i^i lot law

duty Central Bonds could not have been negligent.

\\ ithout such a

Accordingly, the distrk

properly dismissed Fair's negligence/duty claims against Central Bonds.
P'

CENTRAL BONDS' EFFORTS DID NOT RESULT IN A BINDER
OR OTHER CONTRACT OF INSURANCE

Whether a contract has been formed is a question of law. See, e.g., Harris, ]\ 9. In
ill in n tise, plaimnr' Harris, an architect, told defendant Albrecht, an insurance agent, "to
place business and fire1 covnvifM1
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a! his c I hue."

Id., Tf 5. Harris responded that "he would take care of it," and that "he would come out
and look at [the] equipment. Id.
The Harris Court explained why no contract to procure insurance arose from this
exchange:
They did not discuss any of the elements essential to an insurance contract
except that Harris "wanted business and fire coverage on [the] equipment
and the contents" of his architectural business. There was no mention,
except fire, of the types of risks Harris wanted covered, the amount of
indemnity, the duration of coverage, or the premium. Therefore, there was
no meeting of the minds on which to base a contract of insurance. Id., f 10.
A.

There Was No Meeting of the Minds Regarding the Coverage Fair Would
Buy

Mr. Fair knew that bidders for Fair's insurance coverage might propose
"adjustments" to Fair's coverage, which he would then need to evaluate. In fact, Kirchen
and Reed agreed that any bids Kirchen solicited would not "dip as low" as Fair's bid
specifications called for. Consistent with this agreement, Kirchen asked Travelers to
quote Spoilage coverage of $100,000 rather than the $10,000 that Farr's bid
specifications called for. Thus, the amount of indemnity was uncertain until Mr. Fandecided if Fair would pay for the increased coverage. As in Harris, the bid specifications
said nothing about the duration of coverage, or the premium.

Mr. Fair repeatedly

recognized the insurance quotations for what they were: mere bids that he would need to
evaluate.
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IfiuTt" M 111 m iilnior iiilliiii I* in hen MI < 'cnlial Bonds promised • • -lam property
and general liability insurance for Farr. There is no evidence that Farr prom-.-** \
whatever quotation Kirchen and Central Bonds might procure. In 2003 Fair intended to
awai • :i its insi it ance :: inti act t : tl i = 1 : sst 1: idder, as it had foi the preceding 8-10 years.
Just as in Harris, then, there simply was no meeting H (in1 minds nit win- li h> IMW1" j
contract of insurance.
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-102 Does Not Create Any Liability for Central
Bonds
Farr did not claim below, and does not claim on appeal, that it received a writfi'n
binder growing out of Central Bonds efforts. Farr argued below t; ' :i .i.
i|iu'stion

||(

hcie is a

' fiM<
' » '(' ",|ir||| r i |li|> 's-uliji1! | ( 'innajL',*' w-is ouill\ bound un Mas I I -'0IM

by Kirchen and Central Bonds (emphasis added)." (R. 3187)
Fair claims that § 31A 1-102 caused this alleged "oral binder" to still be ii I effect
nil1 ml i ! mi 11 IN n i l I I - i i

I (

I 1 i Ill ill II i I ill i ice independently insurmountable problems

with its argument under § 31A 1402.
First, Farr never explains what Central Bonds did to orally bind coverage on May
il 1, }(H|(i "it ,ii jiiiii1, piiiri inn1

l

rniijl iliimuls lias aheaily sho\ui in J'uinl l\ A dial (hare

was no meeting of the minds on a contract of insurance. Additionalh

antral Bonds

shown elsewhere in this brief that Farr has no competent evidence of any such oral
Itindet
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Second, § 31 A-1-102 does not recognize "oral binders". Section 31 A-1-102(1)
expressly requires "binders" to be in writing. Oral agreements to insure are not binders at
all. They are instead "binding oral contracts of insurance". See § 31A-21-102(2).
Third, § 31A-21-102(5) only provides that written binders are effective until their
cancellation.

Nothing in § 31A-21-102 provides that an oral contract of insurance

continues until cancellation. For all these reasons, the district court properly dismissed
Farr's contract claim against Central Bonds.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED FARR'S BAD
FAITH CLAIM AGAINST CENTRAL BONDS

Utah law recognizes a bad-faith claim in favor of policyholders against their
insurance carriers. See generally, Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah
1985). It is undisputed in this case, however, that neither Kirchen nor Central Bonds is
an insurance carrier.
Because first-party insurance principles do not apply to Farr's claims against
Kirchen and Central Bonds, Farr's bad-faith claim must satisfy standards that have arisen
in the context of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (the "Covenant").
Utah law has long adhered to the fundamental premise that courts will not resort to
the Covenant to make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves.
See, e.g., Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998). Similarly, the Covenant
cannot establish new, independent rights or duties that the parties did not agree to. See
id.
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I

investors in a failed th i ift institution claimed the I Jtah

Department of Financial Institutions f'DIT")' Imul In i-.n linl tl

< 'inn ,mi In i l(iiiuj« \hv

thrift without allowing the investors sufficient time to recoup their investments.

I he

closure resulted trout 1)H > decision not fo continue to count certain "nel worth
certificates" toward tin

ui-,iiiiiin»ii • 111,1(111,1!

M | m'nn ni

illn rvhMiijLi (1

ni|ih

1 In

Covenant despite their "sympathy with plaintiffs' plight," id. at 955, the Utah Supreme
Court held:
plaintiffs cannot point to any express contractual obligation on the part of
DFI to continue to count the net worth certificates toward operating capital
requirements regardless of the ILGCs financial condition, or to any
representation from which we could conclude that DFI assumed the risk of
the ILGCs insolvency.
I hnr is in 1 n idrntv in this 1 -M HI ii I itii suppnil ,1 bad-faith claim against Kirchen and
Central Bonds because there is no agreement that can provide
contractual obligation necessary for the Covenant to arise. For these reasons - and for
uiorandum - there was no Auto Owners insurance
in effect at the time of Fair's Loss, and Central Bonds' denial that *
faith".
1 ' I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PARR'S
ESTOPPEL CLAIM AGAINST CENTRAL BONDS.

For Fair to prevail on its estoppel claim against Central Bonds, the Record must
contain some evidence that Fair took some action "on the faith" of some admission,
statement in ;t" * I" v < "l| n'" >'
829078
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Ifiiw ( / 1 "nn'iii11"! »' Okelberry, 2006

App. 473, If 28, 153 P.3d 745, rev'd on other grounds, 2008 UT 10, f 7, 2008 WL
360842, — P.3d—.
It is undisputed that no one at Fair had ever heard of Kirchen or Central Bonds
prior to Fair's Loss. Farr never received a copy of any binder growing out of Kirchen's
and Central Bonds' efforts. Until May 23, 2003, Mr. Farr thought that Farmers was
insuring Fair. After that and at the time of Farr's Loss, Mr. Farr believed Safeco was
insuring the risks that Farmers would not insure.
As a result, it is not legally possible for Farr to have taken any action on the faith
of any admission, statement or act by Kirchen or Central Bonds. Because Farr took no
such action, the district court properly dismissed Farr's estoppel claim against Central
Bonds.
VII. FARR'S CLAIMS AGAINST CENTRAL BONDS ARE TOO
SPECULATIVE TO STATE A CLAIM
Even if Central Bonds had been able to bind coverage for Farr's Loss (which
Central Bonds could not and did not do), there is no evidence that Fair would have
purchased that coverage. Without such evidence Fair's claims against Central Bonds are
speculative.
In May 2003 Farr "chose Farmers" based on price. Farr had had accepted the
lowest bid for the prior 8-10 years. There is no evidence that even if Central Bonds had
been able to obtain coverage, it would have resulted in the lowest bid.
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The onl> evidence of a quotation from Central Bonds in the record is Deposition
Ex. 57 (R. 3458-67),

lluil ih inlur pmposiil

inn 'Hiitni n miiun

III.II IMII I Ltiiiioil

below (R. 3184-85, 3187) established the "Subject Coverage" and was bound. I here is
no evidence in the Record, however, that the Fair ever laid eyes on premium amount that
appears in Deposition I;x V/'" rilhci tn I Li1" ' l-l .'MIO'i ui ,„it ,nr ' I-IIHT dine,
R e e d testified that he had maintained in his file a complete cop 1 , of his l\l„i"» MUM
proposal t o Fair, that he turned over his entire file to Steve R. T.ove, an expert retained b y
l ; in

mi I i | i , i i ill r"iiv<H« MIIIIMS (i(ii|nnsii! produced l)\ kin ^ now not complete.

2991) The Lund-Leavitt and Diversified bids were ibi aiuouiits deUTininahli In
record, and the Blackburn Jones/Safeco bid was $8,000 higher than the Reed/Farmers
liKil Mini1 is mi ,iifi)M(iiil vva>, IHJWCICI, to recreate what the Reed/Farmers bid was. (R
2991) Thus, the Reed/Farmers bid, which

* as tl le 1c < bi :l I I le i lext

lowest bid was the oral bid from Blackburn Jones/Safeco, which was $8,000 higher than
ii'lir lu'al/hitittns bid.
Thus, Fan* has failed to show that Deposition l ; \ S7 nr .iihlhint.', I'ISC lioin ( 'I'liti.il
Bonds/Auto Owners would have been the low bid. Without such a showing Fair's claims
against (Vnlul H nnh *ue impermissibly speculative because in 2003 and for the 8-10
preceding years, Mr. Fair had accepted the lowest bid ^
Additionally, in Point III, supra, Central Bonds identified nine separate variables
tl lat ( \T' : i ild enter in to I 'arr' s insurance purchasing decision in 2003. In additioi :i to those
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nine variables, Kirchen and Reed had agreed that any bids Kirchen solicited would not
"dip as low" as Fair's bid specifications called for, and Kirchen accordingly asked
Travelers to quote Spoilage coverage of $100,000 rather than the $10,000 that the bid
specifications called for. There is no way of knowing how Fair would have adjusted the
nine variables along with the fact that Central Bonds was attempting to get quotes for
coverage greater than Fair had expressed an intention to purchase.
The Harris decision explains why Farr's claims against Central Bonds are fatally
speculative:
The nature of the losses here underscores the reason summary judgment
was appropriate. The most basic business policy includes $5,000 of
protection for valuable papers. Albrecht only had binding authority up to
$25,000 for valuable papers, and Harris could not have received such
coverage without taking loss-reduction measures. It is also possible that
State Farm would not have bound the policy or that Harris would not have
insured his valuable papers for as much as he now claims. . . . In light of
these unknowns, a jury determination of damages would be purely
speculative.
Harris, 2004 UT 13, ^ 29 n.2.
All these Harris factors apply in this case. First, Central Bonds could not, and
Auto Owners did not, bind a policy for Fair.

Indeed, because of Auto Owners'

reinsurance agreements, Auto Owners could not even write the Spoilage coverage that
would have applied to Farr's Loss. Travelers would have had to write that coverage, and
it is undisputed that Travelers did not bind coverage for Fair.

Second, there is no

evidence in the Record that Travelers would have ultimately (or timely, for that matter)
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written the Spoilage coverage necessary to insure Fair's Loss. Third, given Farr's past
iiisiitviiii r histni 'i linn i- in i nniprli nil i \ u l n u r III.ill I HI

(iiiilill li.n i iiisuiul 1 am s S.illl

Lake building of its inventory for as much as Farr now claims, or the level of deductible
that

i f would have selected. Finally, Mr. Fan* candidly admitted that he purchased
lii 2003 (and in pi ioi } eai s) based on pi ice

I here is no evidence in the Record

that Central Bonds would have produced the low bid if it had been able to produ
at all, of that Fair would have accepted a bid that was higher than other bids.
iise i easons, a jui j determinatior
speculative, and the district court properly disn ••..

"

damages would

. : mpermissibly

*, l.'i nu ,*

* nlial \\\ nn!-.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Ioi the foregoing reasons, this Court should AFFIRM the district court's summary
judgment dismissing all cl.mns th.il

IMII

luiuii'hl in i nulil h.i1 i hnmi'hl againsl K iichrn
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